Abstract. We generalize and improve the schemes of 4]. We introduce analogues of exponentiation and discrete logarithms in the principle cycle of real quadratic orders. This enables us to implement many cryptographic protocols based on discrete logarithms, e.g. a variant of the signature scheme of ElGamal 8].
Introduction

Motivation
The security of many cryptographic protocols (see for example 7] , 8] , 12]) is based on the di culty of solving the discrete logarithm problem (DL-problem) in the multiplicative group GF(p) of prime elds GF(p) of characteristic p > 0.
Recently, Gordon 9] has shown that under reasonable assumptions the discrete DL-problem in GF(p) can be solved in expected time L p 1=3; c] = exp((c + o(1)) (log p) 1=3 (log logp) 2=3 ) by means of the number eld sieve (NFS), thereby lowering the best known asymptotically upper bound considerably. Experience with similar integer factoring algorithms shows that the NFS can be expected to be practical (see 5] , 1]). It is therefore by no means clear that the discrete logarithm problem remains di cult in the future and one must search for other problems that can serve as basis for one-way and trapdoor one-way functions (see for example 4], 10], 11]). It would be useful to have some sort of hierarchy of di cult problems. If one of the problems turns out to be easy one can use the next di cult one that remains intractable. A rst step in this direction is to employ algebraic number elds (see 3]) as a source for computationally hard problems. In 4], 13] it is shown how to use the infrastructure of the cycles of reduced ideals in real quadratic orders to implement the Di e-Hellman key exchange protocol. Breaking that scheme was shown to be at least as hard as factoring. Also, it was the rst case of a Di e-Hellman-implementation which is not based on the arithmetic of a nite abelian group. That application, however, looks rather restricted since it only solves the problem of key management. In this paper we generalize and improve the scheme of 4]. We introduce analogoues of exponentiation and discrete logarithms in the principle cycle of real quadratic orders. This enables us to implement many cryptographic protocols which are based on discrete logarithms, e.g. the ElGamal scheme 8], and we argue that computing generalized discrete logarithms is at least as hard as factoring. This statement enables us to implement many cryptographic protocols. The di culty of inverting exp follows from the following theorem which can be proved using ideas similar to those explained in 4].
Discrete Logarithms in
Theorem1. There is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction of factoring integers to inverting exp.
Computing Powers
Let c be a complex number, and let q 2 Z Z >0 . An approximation of precision q to c is a numberĉ 2 2 ?(q+1) Z Z i] such that jc ?ĉj < 2 ?q . We now present the algorithm EXP. 
EXP determines its result by means of binary exponentiation. The basic operation in the set of reduced principal ideals is ideal multiplication which can be performed in quadratic time followed by ideal reduction which also requires quadratic time. Reduction of ideals is performed using the procedure REDUCE which on input of the discriminant and an ideal B of O returns a reduced ideal in the ideal class of B and a generator of B relative to C. If we compute a reduced principal ideal C in the class of the product of two reduced principal ideals B and B 0 using REDUCE then (C) = (B) + (B 0 ) + logj j. While carrying out binary exponentiation in EXP we therefore accumulate the error term logj j in the variable`. This is done using APPROX which given , a number in K and a precison constant q nds in linear time an approximation of precison q to log j j. After executing the FOR loop we have found an ideal C which is close to x +`. Procedure TARGET then determines a generator of C relative to the real output ideal B. TARGET uses the procedures which were introduced in 6]. Its correctness follows from the arguments presented there. We will show in the full paper that the running time of EXP is cubic just as exponentiation in GF(p).
Algorithm 3 (TARGET).
Input:
2 D, a reduced principal ideal A of O , s 2 Q >0 .
Output:
A minimum that is closest to s or the left neighbor of it.
p := d3 + log e MULT can be easily implemented using the techniques of 6]. Details will be presented in the full paper. Using MULT and EXP one can implement many cryptographic protocols. Clearly, the Di e-Hellman key exchange protocol can be implemented using those techniques. Here we present a variant of the ElGamal sigature scheme 8]. Suppose that Alice wants to be able to sign messages. She chooses a real quadratic discriminant and a reduced principal ideal A of O for which she knows a good approximation a of a representative of (A). That can be realised by randomly choosing a number a 0 2 IR and by a procedure CLOSEIDEAL which given a 0 and a precision p computes in polynomial time A and a such that A is an ideal closest to a 0 or its left neighbor and a is an approzimation of some 2 (A) of precision p. Both and A are made public. Also, the precision in the following computation is p = d3 + log e.
To . It is easy to see that Y 3 must be the reduced principal ideal which is closest to m or its left neighbor. If this is incorrect then the signature is incorrect. As in the original ElGamal scheme, there is currently no other way of breaking this scheme than inverting exp and nding r or a. Again, a formal version of this protocol will be presented in the full version.
